The following in italics are compete chapters taken from The Gallic Wars by Julius Caesar, translated by W. A. McDevitte and W. S. Bohn and available on the Internet Classics Archive which can be found at http://classics.mit.edu/Caesar/gallic.html

Alternatively see section 3 of chapter 2 of the Penguin Classic Caesar: The Conquest of Gaul.

We have throughout added bullet-pointed thoughts on each of these chapters.

When Caesar inquired of them what states were in arms, how powerful they were, and what they could do, in war, he received the following information: that the greater part of the Belgae were sprung, from the Germans, and that having crossed the Rhine at an early period, they had settled there, on account of the fertility of the country, and had driven out the Gauls who inhabited those regions; and that they were the only people who, in the memory of our fathers, when all Gaul was overrun, had prevented the Teutones and the Cimbri from entering their territories; the effect of which was, that, from the recollection of those events, they assumed to themselves great authority and haughtiness in military matters.

• So the Belgae have a high opinion of themselves as tough fighters. Certainly rebuffing the otherwise rampant Teutones and Cimbri was a significant military achievement (there’s a game in there somewhere!).

• The Nervii are reckoned the most warlike of these tough fighters.
• And there are 15,000 Atrebates, and 10,000 Veromandui.

Chapter 16
After he had made three days march through their territories, he discovered from some prisoners, that the river Sambre was not more than ten miles from his camp; that all the Nervii had stationed themselves on the other side of that river, and together with the Atrebates and the Veromandui, their neighbours, were there awaiting the arrival of the Romans; for they had persuaded both these nations to try the same fortune of war [as themselves]: that the forces of the Aduatuci were also expected by them, and were on their march; that they had put their women, and those who through age appeared useless for war, in a place to which there was no approach for an army, on account of the marshes.

• The Nervii, Atrebates and Veromandui are waiting on the other side of the Sambre. Caesar finds this out from prisoners – so he knows they are there.

• Caesar marches, and as is usual sends scouts ahead to pick the site for the camp.
• Acting on the information of Belgic spies that describe the Roman order of march, the Nervii plan to assault a solitary legion which arrives first to build the camp followed by the baggage. They aim to capture the baggage, leaving the remaining legions in enemy territory without supplies etc.
• The Nervii have few cavalry.
• The Nervii build abatis-type barricades to hinder raiding enemy cavalry – implication is they cut down trees and set up the "hedges" in the open. This is not wood plashing (whatever that is). They intend to obstruct the Roman march with them.

• So here is our first description of the terrain and Belgic deployment, and pretty clear it is too.
• Two identical gentle hills on each side of the river. Roman hill is open, Belgic hill is heavily wooded except for 200 paces from the river which is open. The Belgae are concealed in the woods.
• The river has a (maximum?) depth of only 3 feet.
• Belgic cavalry, "a few troops", are in the open ground by the river.

Chapter 19
Caesar, having sent his cavalry on before, followed close after them with all his forces; but the plan and order of the march was different from that which the Belgae had reported to the Nervii. For as he was approaching the enemy, Caesar, according to his custom, led on [as the van six legions unencumbered by baggage; behind them he had placed the baggage- trains of the whole army; then the two legions which had been last raised closed the rear, and were a guard for the baggage-train. Our horse, with the slingers and archers, having passed the river, commenced action with the cavalry of the enemy. While they from time to time betook themselves into the woods to their companions, and again made an assault out of the wood upon our men, who did not dare to follow them in their retreat further than the limit to which the plain and open parts extended, in the mean time the six legions which had arrived first, having measured out the work, began to fortify the camp. When the first part of the baggage train of our army was seen by those who lay hid in the woods, which had been agreed on among them as the time for commencing action, as soon as they had arranged their line of battle and formed their ranks within the woods, and had encouraged one another, they rushed out suddenly with all their forces and made an attack upon our horse. The latter being easily routed and thrown into confusion, the Nervii ran down to the river with such incredible speed that they seemed to be in the woods, the river, and close upon us almost at the same time. And with the same speed they hastened up the hill to our camp, and to those who were employed in the works.

• We have the Roman order of march – six seasoned legions, then the baggage, then the two raw legions.
• This order of march is different to that which the Nervii expect.
• The six seasoned legions are already in the vicinity of the camp and employed in standing guard and building it.
• Roman cavalry, slingers and archers cross the river; the Belgic cavalry retire into the woods, charge out, when beaten back the Romans dare not follow them into the woods. This happens "from time to time".
• The Nervii foot attack as soon as the first part of baggage appears – clearly the signal their plan called for, which was based on their mistaken information on the Roman order of march.
• Roman cavalry is "easily routed and thrown into confusion" – presumably fleeing across the river back to the Roman camp.
• The Nervii attack very quickly, cross the open ground, the river, up the hill to the camp to attack those Romans who are building the camp, with "incredible speed". I assume Romans "employed in the works" refers to those building the rampart and ditch?

Chapter 20
Caesar had every thing to do at one time: the standard to be displayed, which was the sign when it was necessary to run to arms; the signal to be given by the trumpet; the soldiers to be called off from the works; those who had proceeded some distance for the purpose of seeking materials for the rampart, to be summoned; the order of battle to be formed; the soldiers to be encouraged; the watchword to be given.

• So we get a picture of what the Romans were doing from this. Some soldiers are building the works (rampart and ditch). Others have gone off some distance to look for materials. These two groups have to be summoned to arms. How big a group is this? From standard Roman doctrine, we assume half a legion standing to arms while half a legion works.

• So the seasoned soldiers know to form battle line without being told.

and [secondly] that Caesar had forbidden his several lieutenants to depart from the works and their respective legions, before the camp was fortified. These, on account of the near approach and the speed of the enemy, did not then wait for any command from Caesar, but of themselves executed whatever appeared proper.

• The Roman generals are all with their legions, and get on with forming the battle line without awaiting orders from Caesar.

Chapter 21
Caesar, having given the necessary orders, hastened to and fro into whatever quarter fortune carried him, to animate the troops, and came to the tenth legion. Having encouraged the soldiers with no further speech than that "they should keep up the remembrance of their wonted valor, and not be confused in mind, but valiantly sustain the assault of the enemy ;" as the latter were not further from them than the distance to which a dart could be cast, he gave the signal for commencing battle. And having gone to another quarter for the purpose of encouraging [the soldiers], he finds them fighting. Such was the shortness of the time, and so determined was the mind of the enemy on fighting, that time was wanting not only for affixing the military insignia, but even for putting on the helmets and drawing off the covers from the shields. To whatever part any one by chance came from the works (in which he had been employed), and whatever standards he saw first, at these he stood, lest in seeking his own company he should lose the time for fighting.

• Caesar has time to encourage one legion (the Xth) but finds the next he visits already fighting.
• The Roman soldiers building the works rush to the battle line in ad hoc units, some without time to put on their helmets or remove their shield covers. Clearly there was no time to lose.

Chapter 22
The army having been marshaled, rather as the nature of the ground and the declivity of the hill and the exigency of the time, than as the method and order of military matters required; while the legions in the different places were withstanding the enemy, some in one quarter, some in another, and the view was obstructed by the very thick hedges intervening, as we have before remarked, neither could proper reserves be posted, nor could the necessary measures be taken in each part, nor could all the commands be issued by one person. Therefore, in such an unfavorable state of affairs, various events of fortune followed.

• We hear later of pairs of legions fighting effectively individual battles, and this tells us why: the open hill is not as open as we had supposed – there are thick, artificial hedges separating the battle into segments, seemingly parallel to the line of attack. Line of sight is obstructed, reserves cannot move from one part to another, and the Roman army cannot be commanded from one point.
• These hedges: clearly they separate the battle into at least three parts. They must also funnel the attacking Belgae into channels. This could be a factor in why the Romans can hold on initially – the assault cannot outflank the Roman makeshift line because the hedges prevent it. The question is: are the hedges more numerous than the two separating the three pairs of legions? Are the hedges placed transversely across the hill slopes as well? My feeling is no: Caesar describes the hill as open, so it cannot be too cluttered. My interpretation then is two thick hedges running from the camp down to the river. I assume the advance Roman camp party had cleared the actual camp area.

Chapter 23
The soldiers of the ninth and tenth legions, as they had been stationed on the left part of the army, casting their weapons, speedily drove the Atrebates (for that division had been opposed to them,) who were breathless with running and fatigue, and worn out with wounds, from the higher ground into the river; and following them as they were endeavoring to pass it, slew with their swords a great part of them while impeded (therein). They themselves did not hesitate to pass the river; and having advanced to a disadvantageous place, when the battle was renewed, they [nevertheless] again put to flight the enemy, who had returned and were opposing them.

• The IXth and Xth legions quickly drive the tired Atrebates back down the hill and into the river.
• As the Atrebates flee across the river they take heavy casualties.
• The IXth and Xth pursue them, but then find themselves in a difficult position as the Atrebates rally and return to the fight – this disadvantageous place is presumably fighting enemy uphill in wooded terrain.
• Note the ability of the Atrebates to rally their warriors and renew the fight after having broken once already.
• The IXth and Xth break the Atrebates again.

• The XIth and IIIVth legions do the same job but halt at the river bank.
• Is there an implication here that although the Veromandui have routed, the Romans are still fighting? Perhaps some of the Nervii who had not yet crossed the river were engaging them?

• With the IXth and Xth on the left across the river and into the woods, and the XIth and IIIVth down at the river bank, the front and left side of the camp are exposed.
• The XIIth on the far right, and the VIIth next to them, face the entire strength of the Nervii "in a very close body".
• The Nervii are now able send two groups to (i) "begin to surround" the XIIth and VIIth legions’ "unprotected flank" and (ii) to penetrate the camp and make for the top of the hill, which was probably the centre of the camp.
• Which "unprotected flank" do the Nervii begin to surround? The preceding part of the sentence would seem to imply that it is the legions’ left flank, it being open because the other legions are down at the river or beyond. So the Nervii have found a way of at least slowly filtering warriors through the hedge obstacles – since they built them, we should not be surprised at this.

• The original scouting cavalry, slingers and archers, who routed when the Belgae first attacked fro the wood, are now arriving back at the camp – so they cannot have routed directly up the hill to the camp.
• They meet the Nervii in the camp and rout again.
• The camp-followers, thinking there is plunder to be had after the victory of the other four legions, are panicked by seeing the enemy in the camp.
• Those in the baggage train, whose arrival triggered the Belgic attack, now rout in all directions as well.
• The allied Gallic auxiliary cavalry arrive next after the baggage in the Roman order of march – they see the chaos and head quickly for home spreading tales of Roman defeat.

• So what has Caesar been up to all this time? In Chapter 21 we learnt that he went to the Xth on the far left wing first, and then to another legion. We now discover that this was the XIIth on the extreme right wing. He finds them at breaking point, crowded together and unable to fight effectively, with many of their leaders (centurions) dead or wounded, and visibly shrinking back from the fight.
• The Nervii are now fighting their front and both flanks.
• Caesar sees there are no reserves, so personally takes up a shield and enters the front line, encouraging the soldiers. Interesting that he was able to do this – it suggests perhaps a surge/lull/surge pattern to the battle, as he is able to insert himself in the front line and communicate with enough men around him to make a difference – this may have been very difficult to achieve if he did it during desperate hand-to-hand fighting.
• The situation is stabilised and collapse is prevented.

• This tells us that the VIIth is close by but not actually joined to the XIIth. Caesar orders them to link up. By supporting each other they further regain confidence in their ability to withstand the assault.
• The Nervii on top of the hill in the Roman camp now see the two raw legions arriving next in the Roman order of march.
• The IXth and Xth legions have now pushed right up the wooded hill and captured the Belgic camp.
• Somehow Titus Labienus, commanding them, sees what is happening in the Roman camp across on the top of the other hill – perhaps he is able to see from a clearing in the woods from the top of one hill to the other. He can’t see that much because when he sends the Xth to the rescue they learn just how bad things are they quicken up their return to the battle.
• Note no mention of the VIIIth and XIth legions in the centre down at the river banks. We must assume they remain heavily engaged, but are able to defend the river bank so are not hard-pressed and their flanks are not threatened.

Chapter 27
By their arrival, so great a change of matters was made, that our men, even those who had fallen down exhausted with wounds, leaned on their shields, and renewed the fight: then the camp-retainers, though unarmed, seeing the enemy completely dismayed, attacked [them though] armed; the horsemen too, that they might by their valor blot the disgrace of their flight, thrust themselves before the legionary soldiers in all parts of the battle.

• Suddenly the returning Xth turns the battle – the Romans become confident, the Nervii dismayed.

• But the Nervii do not break. They fight to the last man with great courage and defiance, which Caesar admires.
• Some final detail on the terrain, which he suggests was difficult. The river was "very broad", the banks "very high", but the Nervii had made light of them because of their great spirit.

• The warriors have been virtually wiped out – 500 left from the 60,000.
• Caesar, for political reasons, decides to spare and prevent harm to the old men, women and children of the tribes.

Eight legions of 10 cohorts each, each legion strength of around 5000 – close to full strength since little fighting has occurred up until now in the campaign season.

Six legions should be seasoned (but not veteran), two are newly-raised and since Caesar is in the habit of keeping such troops to the rear in his major battles, we should consider them at this stage to be raw. Your rules should differentiate between the two.

On the Roman left are (from left to right) the Xth and IXth legions, in the centre the VIIth then XIth, and then on the right the VIIth and then the XIIth on the far right. Each legion should be deployed slightly separated from the legion it is "paired" with and each pair of legions should be reasonably well separated from other pairs. This should allow the game to proceed in 3 separate "theatres" like the historical battle. (See Battle Map and the section on Terrain below) All the legions are armed with pila, shields and would be mail armoured.

Around two thirds of each legion, 6 or 7 cohorts, should be stood to arms about half way down the hill from the Roman camp (see Battle Map), while 2 or 3 cohorts are engaged in building the ditch and ramparts for the camp and 1 cohort is "scattered" seeking materials. The troops building the camp fortifications should be placed around the outline of the camp and will need to be rallied to the battle lines when the game starts. As this is unlikely to be specifically handled by the rules you may wish to introduce a scenario specific rule to cover this. The "scattered" cohort from each legion should be the most difficult to bring back into the battle line but should be able to enter the fighting as Caesar does not mention troops missing the fight.

There is a small amount of allied Gallic cavalry scouts (say 500), light infantry javelinmen ("Numidians") (say 200) and archers ("Cretans") (say 200) across the river on the open ground before the wood. As they have been fighting the Belgic cavalry they should be very close to the edge of the wood as these kept retreating inside. However, they should be positioned so that they cannot see the mass of Belgic warriors inside the woods, and so the actual distance will be determined by your rule sets visibility rules. The Gallic cavalry should be lightly armed with spears and shields and may have some mail armour. The Numidians and Cretans should be unarmoured with javelins and shields and bows respectively.

The substantial Roman baggage train should be arriving gradually, and approaching the camp. Sighting the baggage was the signal for the Belgic attack, so the front of the baggage should start the game on the top of the hill – the first time it comes into sight of the Belgic warriors on the hill opposite. It should be arriving in the area being fortified as the Roman camp. The actual amount of baggage train you wish to depict is up to you, however, an 8 legion army would have a lot of baggage.

The allied Treviri cavalry, say 1,000 strong, are off-table and will arrive after the baggage but before the two raw legions. The Treviri are probably reluctant, "fair weather" allies. Certainly, they are very brittle and will flee at the first sign of trouble. For example, if the Nervii are in the Roman camp when they arrive, they should have a strong chance of promptly fleeing, as happened historically. They should be armed as the Gallic cavalry above.

These should be followed by the final two newly recruited legions.

The baggage, allied cavalry and raw legions are arriving in a long column of march, and as Caesar gives no indication that the late arriving fighting troops were "marching to the sound of the guns" there should be a significant time period before these arrive on table. How this reinforcement is handled will depend on your rule set.

60,000 Nervii foot warriors, plus optional maximum 600 cavalry

15,000 Atrebates foot warriors, plus optional maximum 150 cavalry

10,000 Veromandui foot warriors, plus optional maximum 100 cavalry

The warriors should be deployed in their three tribal groups, inside but on the edge of the wood, each facing a pair of Roman legions. (See Battle Map) Naturally the depth of the Nervii will be greater, but so will their frontage – this is the part of the battle where the Romans almost lost it, because the Nervii were able to get round their flanks.

If depicted the Gallic cavalry are armed as those in the Roman army and should be of average morale. All the foot warriors should be unarmoured except for a few richer individuals who would have mail. All carry a shield and a personal choice of combat weapons - spears, javelins and swords. Spears are lighter than the Roman pilum. The Atrebates and Veromandui should be of average morale, however, the Nervii may warrant a higher morale rating based on the description of them in Caesar’s account and the fact they fought nearly to the death (at least if we believe Caesar).

Two gentle sloping hills, separated by the River Sambre. The hills should slope gently down to the river on both sides, so troops nearer the river are always downhill of those further away.

The Belgic hill is heavily wooded except for the last 200 paces before the river.

The Roman hill is open, except for the artificial "hedges" made by the Nervii to obstruct Roman movement. These hedges served to make it difficult to move troops laterally across the battlefield and obstructed sight. Therefore, we suggest that the hedges are represented by obstacles running from the marked out camp down the hill between each of the three pairs of legions, effectively dividing the battlefield into three separate parts on the Roman side of the river. There should be no hedges on the Belgic side of the river. The exact mechanics of how these hedges affect movement, communication and visibility will depend on your rule set, however, the basic effect noted above must be adhered to.

The Roman camp is on the top of the Roman hill. The plan of the camp is marked out, tents pitched or in the process of being pitched. The ditch and ramparts have been started but are not in any state to be defensible, and so do not provide any movement restrictions or combat modifiers. The camp area will be extensive as an 8 legion army would need a lot of space to encamp.

The Belgic camp is on the top of the Gallic hill. This could be represented by a few wagons perhaps.

The River Sambre is no more than 3 foot deep, but has steep banks. Nonetheless, it should not slow down the Belgic attack. Troops defending the banks of the river should be advantaged against those attacking them. Troops fleeing while being pursued across the river should take heavy casualties. Your chosen rule set will determine exactly how this is handled, or whether some specific rules need to be used for this scenario.

Although there is earlier cavalry action, we choose to start the battle at the point that the Belgae foot attack from the woods as the earlier action had little effect on the outcome. Despite Caesar implying that he knew they were there, we suggest he was taken by surprise by the speed and ferocity of this attack. We postulate that if he had been expecting attack, he would not have had his army so dispersed. It is important that your game allow for the initial disorganisation and dispersion of the Roman legions.